De l’influence réciproque de l’esclavage sur la religion, et de la religion sur l’esclavage.

CHAP. 18: > On the reciprocal influence of slavery on religion, and of religion on slavery.

Since associations have been formed in England for the gradual abolition of slavery in the colonies, the best means of preparing the enslaved populations for liberty has been sought. The one on which all minds seem to have agreed is religious instruction; consequently, all possible measures have been taken to instruct or to raise the slaves in the principles of the Christian religion. An effort has been made to secure for them one day of rest per week; missionaries have been sent to them who have devoted themselves to their instruction with a courage and a selflessness worthy of the greatest praise. Can such honorable intentions and sacrifices have the results that are hoped for? Is not servitude essentially exclusive, for slaves as for masters, of the principles of religion that one would wish to give to both? If the practice of slavery and the practice of religion were incompatible, it would be in vain that one would wish to make them march abreast: talent, courage, and selflessness cannot reconcile contradictions.

Two kinds of interest guide the men who aspire to the abolition of slavery: one is that of a world to come, the other is that of the present world. These two interests not being irreconcilable, it is natural that one should seek to make them triumph by the same means, and that philosophers and ministers of several Christian denominations should act in concert, although they do not, in all things, have common opinions; but the order in which these means must be employed is here of great importance. To move the enslaved populations from slavery to liberty, must one first give them the morals and doctrines of the Christian religion? Or to make them adopt the morals and principles of the Christian religion, must one begin by assuring them some liberty? If it were true that slavery, by its very nature, repelled the principles of this religion, then emancipation would have to precede religious teaching, or at least march abreast with it, without which one would make vain efforts to arrive at the proposed goal.

One of the principal motives guiding the defenders of the enslaved populations, in the efforts they make to give them religious sentiments, is to prevent the catastrophes that the transition from servitude to liberty gives cause to fear; it is thought that these catastrophes would be avoided if, before being free, the slaves had the principles and morals of the Christian religion. It is not, therefore, merely a matter of inculcating sterile maxims or dogmas in the minds of the slaves; they must also be given principles that direct their conduct, and whose observance is for them a duty. To have them learn formulas of belief, which would be without influence on their morals or their actions, would not be to make them religious and moral men, it would be to make religion an empty formulary. Such a procedure would not avoid any of the calamities one wishes to prevent; for a people can know how to recite formulas, have a more or less strong belief, and yet be an atrocious people. The men who carried out the Sicilian Vespers and the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre were neither pagans nor unbelievers; they had preachers; they knew how to read the Gospels much better than the slaves will know how to read them for a long time; they had a faith as strong as our own, and the hatreds or vengeances they had to satisfy were less profound, and were no more just than those that the planters of the colonies have kindled in the hearts of their slaves.

Any idea of religion or morality necessarily carries with it the idea of duties to be fulfilled, and it is impossible to separate the idea of duties from the idea of independence and will. The duties that the Christian religion imposes relate either to the individual himself, or to other persons, or to the Divinity. All these duties, which are very numerous, necessarily overlap, and if they are divided, it is only to make them better understood. It is evident, in fact, that if every man owes it to himself to protect himself from habits or actions that can degrade his moral faculties or even his physical organs, he is under the same obligation with respect to all the persons toward whom he has been subjected to duties. It is no less evident that the duties a man must fulfill toward his fellow men are equally duties toward the Being who has imposed them upon him: if it were otherwise, religion could be reconciled with the most profound immorality, and even with the greatest crimes.

But, the moment we admit that every individual has duties to fulfill in his capacity as a man or a woman, in his capacity as a husband or a wife, in his capacity as a father or a child, a sister or a brother, we elevate the slave to the level of the master, we place limits on the authority of the one and the obedience of the other; that is to say, we abolish slavery, for there is no longer any slavery as soon as the relations between men are determined by the duties that result from their own nature, and not by the caprices of those to whom force has subjected them.To admit that men have duties to fulfill is, in fact, to admit that they must remain faithful to them, even when their fulfillment may bring more or less severe penalties. The very word duties implies that the one upon whom they are imposed may suffer unfortunate consequences in fulfilling them. The esteem we grant to men is very often only in proportion to the sacrifices to which they have voluntarily submitted to remain faithful. Even martyrdom is not, in the spirit of the Christian religion, a sufficient reason to violate the obligations to which one is subject. Christianity would never have spread if it had admitted, as an excuse for a vice or a crime, the fear of punishment or even of death. The heroes of the Christian religion are but men who have sacrificed their lives to remain faithful to their consciences.

If we now wish to know whether the Christian religion is reconcilable with slavery, let us suppose, on the one hand, a more or less large number of persons whom we call slaves, and, on the other, another person, whom we call a master; let us suppose further that the slaves are fully convinced of the truth of the maxims of the religion they have been taught, that they have the firm resolution to conform their conduct to it, and that, for his part, the master is no less persuaded of his own omnipotence, and that he has the public force at his disposal to enforce his will. Let us see what will happen between a disarmed multitude, yet one resolved to conduct itself according to the precepts of its religion, and an armed troop that considers it a duty to blindly execute the orders given by an individual called a master.

One of the most positive precepts of Christianity is the prohibition of all servile labor on Sundays; but the master takes no account of this prohibition; he orders his slaves to engage in their accustomed labors. The slaves do their duty: they resist. The master has them flogged; no matter: they submit to the torture and remain faithful to their belief. Here is a first limit to the owner's power; he cannot attempt to cross it without drawing upon himself the hatred of his slaves, without inciting them to resistance, or without destroying his property.

Another precept of the Christian religion, no less positive than the preceding one, is that which commands spouses to remain united, and which makes fidelity a mutual duty for them. A master sells one of his female slaves, and the buyer prepares to take her away; but this slave is married; she does not want to be separated from her husband, and the husband for his part does not want to be separated from her. What will happen? The masters will have these two slaves flogged to overcome their resistance; but, faithful to their belief, they will remain united. If violence separates them momentarily, duty will reunite them the first moment they cease to be watched; for the religion that teaches that a wife must leave her father and mother to remain with her husband, nowhere teaches that a wife must leave her husband to go with a buyer.

The relations of family or kinship will at every moment hinder the exercise of the master's power, or the fulfillment of the moral and religious duties of the slaves. If a female slave receives an order from her master, and if her husband gives her a contrary order, which of the two will she obey? One of the first duties of parents is undoubtedly to take care of their children, to see to their education, to form their morals, to protect their weakness. One of the first duties of children is to respect their parents, to obey them, to take care of them in their old age. But, if a master brutifies his young slaves, if he mistreats them unjustly, if he gives them false beliefs, if he prostitutes them, will it not be a duty for the parents to protect them, if they have the power? If they cannot protect them by force, will it not be a duty to save them by flight? If, on the other hand, a master mistreats his old slaves or if he lets them lack the things necessary for their existence, will it not be a duty for their children to care for them and to obey them in preference to their owner?

It is not customary among the owners of men, and still less among their agents, to have great respect for female slaves; they must submit to their desires and their caprices under penalty of being flogged. But, on the other hand, religion makes a duty of chastity; it admits between the sexes only the relations that result from marriage; it considers adultery as one of the gravest crimes. However, what will happen if a master or his overseer wants to do violence to a female slave? Can this slave not legitimately defend herself? Will her father, her brothers, her husband not be obliged to fly to her aid? Should they be stopped, in the fulfillment of this duty, by the fear of torture? Those among them who perish in these horrible struggles, should they not be considered by the others as martyrs of religion and morality? Will they not be in a position analogous to that of the early Christians who suffered martyrdom to remain faithful to their belief?

That is not all: the relations that exist in a society are not all relations of kinship. To prepare slaves for liberty, one must make it their duty to respect the property of others, to render to each what is due to him; one must explain to them the commandment that forbids each from taking or retaining what belongs to others; one must above all make them understand well that they cannot, without being guilty of a crime, seize by violence the property of others or the fruits of their labor. But how can one give them such a teaching without them immediately demanding for themselves the fulfillment of the duties imposed on them toward others? If it is a crime on their part to use cunning, force, or violence to seize the fruit of others' labors, it is a crime on the part of others to seize, by the same means, the fruit of their own labors. They will therefore be able to legitimately keep all that they have produced by their industry; in retaining the fruits of their pains, they will only be fulfilling their duties; for it will be easier for them to give aid to their wives and to the children to whom they owe themselves first, and then they will prevent the masters from being guilty of extortion.

It is not enough, for the emancipation of slaves to be without danger to their owners, to make it their duty to render to each what is due to him; it is necessary above all, and this is the most important point, to teach them to respect persons; it is necessary to teach them that vengeance and cruelty are crimes; that it belongs only to justice to inflict punishments on men who have deserved them. But, if at the same time that they are given this teaching, they continue to be subjected to arbitrary punishments; if they continue to be flogged without cause and without procedure, can they consider their masters otherwise than as a band of brigands, who escape legal penalties only through the partiality of the magistrates? If they become the strongest, will their first duty not be to organize less iniquitous tribunals, and to deliver to them all the men whom long impunity has corrupted?

Thus, in giving slaves a religious instruction, one will either teach them that there are duties for men to fulfill, and one will succeed in convincing them; or one will confine oneself to teaching them a few dogmas, without speaking to them of duties. If, in order to prepare them to make good use of liberty, one gives them a sense of their duties, one emancipates them by that very act; for one teaches them to resist any order that would be in opposition to the duties one has laid out for them. If, on the contrary, fearing to dispose them to resistance, one confines oneself to teaching them a few dogmas, without speaking of their duties, or at least without convincing them that it is important for them to observe them even when there is danger, one does nothing either for religion or for the safety of the masters.

There are other duties than those which arise from the relations between men: one could teach slaves the love of labor, temperance, economy, decency, cleanliness, and other social virtues; but the teaching of these duties would still be in vain if no liberty existed. Would it not be a cruel mockery to go and preach temperance and economy to men who have to consume per week only five herrings and a few pounds of flour? On what and for what reason would they make savings, since they have nothing beyond what is strictly necessary to sustain their existence, and they can possess nothing of their own, nor transmit anything to their children? Would it not be a still more cruel mockery to go and preach against laziness and idleness to men who, from daybreak, are awakened by the cracking of the whips, who are harassed with blows all day long, and who can only return at night to their miserable huts? What would be the use of recommending decency and modesty to beings who have no clothes to cover themselves, and who are locked in huts like beasts? It must not be concealed: the teaching of the moral duties that religion imposes must destroy slavery, or slavery must prevent the establishment of religion [352].

The owners of men have not been mistaken about the effects that the teaching of moral duties would produce on the minds of their slaves. I fear, says a respectable missionary sent to Jamaica, I fear that the planters themselves may place an obstacle to the moral and religious instruction of the slaves. It is certain that a great number of them, far from encouraging the negroes to frequent the places consecrated to religion, are opposed to all instruction, and particularly to the means by which it can be given most effectively; that is to say, to the frequenting of the plantations by members of the clergy or by other persons, with a view to instructing the slaves... The principal objection of the planters is, I am certain, that the slaves, being instructed, would be less diligent in their work, would be less disposed to obey the overseers, and would be more impatient and more capable of shaking off the yoke [353].

The author who made these observations seems to believe that the planters' fears are ill-founded. The Christian religion, he says, instead of making a man discontented with the position in which the Divinity has placed him, has a contrary tendency. It does not keep the mind of man attached to the earth, but carries it toward greater and higher objects, toward an eternal happiness. It makes him consider the labors and fatigues of this short life as a secondary object and hardly worthy of a being called to enjoy immortality... It teaches, moreover, all men to submit to the orders of man for the love of God, and slaves, to obey their masters in all things; what is more, it teaches them to honor them and not to seek to acquire their liberty by illegitimate means [354].

If it were possible to persuade the owners of men by cunning to renounce the exercise of arbitrary power, perhaps one should not be too scrupulous about it; to retake by finesse what has been seized by violence may not be a great evil in morality. But one would be deluding oneself to imagine that the planters do not understand the nature of their possessions, and that they are incapable of discerning what might compromise them or assure them of absolute control. One must therefore present things as they are, and as they see them: in morality, as in all sciences, only truth is infallible.

The Christian religion, it is said, teaches man to be content with his position; it detaches him from the earth, and gives him the courage to bear the sufferings of human life; it teaches the slave to obey his master and even to respect him. Without a doubt, it teaches that; but does it not teach something else? Would those of its ministers who cross the seas to go and instruct slaves propose only to become the auxiliaries of the overseers who lead them into the fields, whip in hand? Religion teaches slaves to obey their master! But does not the whip that tears their skin give them the same lesson? It detaches them from this world! But do not the outrages, the violence, the tortures that make them desire death, detach them from it any less? Who will say, however, that this is a religious teaching? If the morality of religion were confined to preaching obedience to a master's orders; if the ministers who go to teach it proposed only to serve the same purpose as the overseers' whips, the masters, far from repelling them, would welcome them with gratitude.

The morality of Christianity teaches man to be content with the position in which Providence has placed him, when that position is an inevitable consequence of the fulfillment of his duties. It detaches man from the earth, but it is to attach him more strongly to the duties imposed upon him; for it is not to him who tramples them underfoot that it promises a better future. It teaches him to bear sufferings, but it is to determine him to do what he must, without inquiring into the consequences that may befall him, and not to engage him in the career of vice. It makes obedience a duty for him, when the commands are just and conform to morality; but it obliges him to resistance when he cannot obey without violating his duties. It obliges him above all to resist vile and malevolent passions, and, among the passions of this kind, there is none more fatal than the fear of the evils that follow the fulfillment of his duties. Finally, it commands the slave to respect his masters, but it commands him still more strongly to hate and despise the vices with which most masters are infected.

It is therefore the very precepts by which the ministers of religion wish to recommend it to the owners of slaves that make it odious in their eyes. For an owner of men to reign as a sovereign, his slaves must not know an authority superior to his will, and in their eyes, nothing must be above the rewards he can grant or the punishments he can inflict. Now, the moment that religious teaching imposes duties on a slave, the moment it presents him with infinite rewards if he remains faithful to them, and endless punishments if he betrays them, the master's promises and threats are no longer of any importance. They are no longer, to use the terms of the writer I have just cited, but secondary objects that are hardly worthy of fixing the attention of a being called to enjoy immortality. Is a slave not, in fact, emancipated the moment the fears and hopes his master inspires in him count for nothing?

I have observed that the teaching of moral duties must limit and reduce to almost nothing the power of masters over their slaves, or that slavery must repel the teaching and diffusion of all the moral duties that religion imposes. It might suffice, to be convinced of the truth of this observation, to know, on the one hand, what are the nature and effects of slavery, and to know, on the other, the moral nature of man and the moral precepts that the Christian religion imposes. However, to make this truth more perceptible, I will set forth the religious character of the various classes of the population in the principal colonies.

The Christian religion forbids separating the man and woman united by the bonds of marriage. The owners of men have found a way to reconcile this precept with the exercise of absolute power over their slaves; following the example of the Romans, they have, in general, let the enslaved men and women live as they saw fit, without having their union preceded by any ceremony, either religious or legal. In the English colonies, if one excepts a small number of parishes in Jamaica, the marriage of two slaves is unknown; things are no more advanced in this regard in the colonies of other nations. Marriage, in fact, imposing mutual duties on the spouses, and the owners of men not admitting that their slaves can have duties to fulfill, except toward their person, they have had to proscribe all legitimate union [355].To allow slaves the ability to fulfill, on Sunday, the duties imposed by the Christian religion, the English government has forbidden their owners from compelling them to work on that day. But this prohibition scarcely benefits those for whom it was made; the masters' cupidity has found a way to compel them to work on the prohibited day, by leaving them only that day to earn their living, or to go far afield to seek the items they need for the week. Thus, although churches are very few, they are generally deserted, even in places where one finds troops of slaves. The result is that the slaves employed in agriculture, who in Jamaica form nine-tenths of the population, do not even have the outward appearance of religion; they are still as idolatrous as if they were on the banks of the Gambia or the Niger [356].

This state of brutification of the slaves is not merely the effect of the masters' carelessness or even their cupidity; no, it is the effect of their calculation. All moral sentiment must be extinguished in the enslaved population, so that the vices of its owners can develop without obstacle. Not long ago in Barbados, a minister of religion who had succeeded in forming a congregation of freedmen and slaves so irritated the masters that he nearly perished at their hands. In the month of October 1823, the men of the master class, after having engaged in a long series of outrages against a missionary and the members of his congregation, assembled in a secret committee, drafted a proclamation, and published it. This proclamation stated that the bourgeoisie (the gentry) and other inhabitants of Barbados had resolved to assemble on the following Sunday for the purpose of demolishing the Methodist chapel, and it invited the persons to whom it was addressed to be at the location, well supplied with the necessary tools. The proclamation had its effect; on the appointed day, the church was surrounded by the armed mob of slave-owners; they broke down the door and windows; they destroyed the pews and the pulpit; they tore up and trampled underfoot a considerable number of Bibles and other religious books used by the blacks and their school, and demolished a part of the building. From there, they proceeded to the missionary's dwelling, destroyed every piece of his furniture, chopped the tables and chairs to pieces, removed the roof of the house, made flags of his linens, waved them in the air, and three times three, they let out ferocious howls as a sign of their victory. Fatigue forced them to suspend their destruction; they arranged to meet the following day; and indeed, the next day, they went to the church; they did not leave one stone upon another. The operation finished, they published the following proclamation:

Bridgetown, Wednesday, 21 October 1823.

"The inhabitants of this island are respectfully informed that in consequence of the unprovoked and unmerited attacks, which have been repeatedly made by the community of Methodist missionaries, the villainous African Society (otherwise known as agents to the villanous African Society) [357], a number of respectable gentlemen have formed the resolution to put an end to the Methodist affair; that, with this in view, they began their work on Sunday evening, and that they have the very great satisfaction of announcing that at midnight they completed the ruin of the church. They must add to this information that the missionary escaped in a small vessel yesterday at noon, and has taken refuge on the island of St. Vincent, thereby avoiding the manifestation, toward him, of the public sentiments he so well deserved. It is to be hoped that, as this proclamation will be spread throughout all the islands and colonies, all persons who consider themselves true friends of religion will follow the laudable example of the Barbadians, by putting an end to Methodism and to Methodist churches."

Meanwhile, the missionary received word that the masters had resolved to demolish the house of the relatives with whom he had taken refuge, and to hang him if they could find him. Convinced that they would carry out their resolution if he left them the time, he had his wife hide in a negro's hut, and went to hide near the seashore; from there he embarked for the island of St. Vincent. Having arrived on that island, the governor provisionally suspended him from his duties, unable to suppose that all the fault lay with the planters; and he sent another missionary to Barbados to gather testimony.

This new missionary arrived, but he was not permitted to disembark. He first learned that a resolution had been made to set fire to his vessel. Soon after, he was informed that boats were being prepared to come and seize him and put him to death. However, word was sent to him that he was being given twenty-four hours to withdraw; but that if he did not take advantage of this delay, he should not complain of the consequences of his obstinacy. The captain, frightened by these threats, withdrew and placed himself under the protection of the artillery of a warship [358].

In reading the descriptions of this violence, one might think that the missionaries against whom it was directed were provoking the slaves to insurrection, or that, at the very least, they were describing the vices of their masters in too vivid colors; far from it, they exhorted them to be patient, to work with zeal, and to practice the virtues that Christianity teaches. Scarcely had the one we saw so unworthily outraged withdrawn to St. Vincent than he hastened to write to his friends, for fear that the violence to which they were subject might lead them to some excess. "Be patient toward all men," he told them; "speak only with respect of every person constituted in authority, and never use reprisals against those who insult you [359]."

No less serious violence has been committed in other colonies against ministers of religion. In Demerara, the masters, under the pretext of an insurrection that their own violence had incited, condemned to the gallows a missionary whose conduct and sermons were irreproachable. If there are colonies where ministers of religion are not exposed to the same violence, it is because these ministers generally give no instruction to the slaves, or because they themselves have already adopted the morals that characterize the masters.

I have previously described the extreme care with which the slave-owners of the United States see to the brutification of their slaves. If one cannot, without being found guilty in the eyes of the masters, teach an enslaved individual to read or write, it is all the more forbidden to teach him that there exist for him duties superior to his master's orders. There too, churches have been seen, not demolished, but burned down by men who feared that the teaching of religious precepts would restrict their power over their slaves [360]. In Louisiana, the enslaved population is no less devoid of religion than in Jamaica. One traveler even thought it was impossible to give them any tincture of it. Slavery, being in opposition to religion, he says, necessarily tends to destroy it [361].

Slavery is far more incompatible with any religious sentiment in the master than in the slave. The latter, however arbitrary the power to which he is subject, can believe that duties exist for him, whether toward himself, toward others, or toward the Divinity; he can observe them as long as he is not prevented by an invincible force; he can face punishment and even death rather than commit a vicious or criminal act. But a master cannot simultaneously believe that duties exist for all men, and that he can legitimately dispose of his fellow men as property. These two beliefs are mutually exclusive; if he is convinced that the individuals he holds in bondage have duties only toward him, he is necessarily convinced that they have no duties toward themselves, toward other men, or even toward the Divinity.

In all countries, much has been written against the philosophers; they have been accused of unbelief, atheism, materialism, and finally of all the opinions thought likely to make them odious to the nations. I have no need to examine whether these reproaches were made in good faith, or whether they were well or ill-founded; but I believe I can observe here that if there is any class of individuals in the world to whom they apply, there is none that deserves them as much as the slave-owners. Is there, in fact, an unbelief more frightening for the human race than that of individuals who deny the existence of every kind of duty? Have the men who have been reproached for affecting cynicism in their impiety ever had the impudence to maintain that a father owes nothing to his children, that a son owes nothing to his mother? Have they ever dared to publish that a husband owes nothing to his wife, nor a wife to her husband? Have they ever degraded men to the point of maintaining that a human being has no duty to fulfill, neither toward himself, nor toward others?

The unbelief that concerns the existence of all moral duties is more fatal and I would even say more impious than that which might concern a future life or the existence of a supreme being. What, in fact, would belief in another life or even in the Divinity matter to one who simultaneously believed he had no duty to fulfill, neither toward himself, nor toward others, nor toward the one who gave him life? Does not the man who makes cunning and force the measure of his rights, and who recognizes no other duty than to obey a master's whims, deny the existence of all moral duties, the existence of justice, and the precepts of all religion? Does he not, consequently, deny the existence of any relationship between man and a supreme being? By making himself the goal and center of all the duties of the men he holds in bondage, does he not substitute himself for not only the entire human race, but for the Divinity itself?

If, in fact, one recognizes that a human being, by the very fact that he exists, has duties to fulfill toward himself, toward his children, toward his parents, toward his husband or wife, toward humanity, and finally, toward the Divinity, one recognizes by that very fact that he can neither alienate himself nor be alienated by others; the commitments he may make or that others may make for him are necessarily limited by the duties imposed upon him. These duties, being prior to everything, cannot be destroyed by either whim or force; they can serve as mutual limits to one another; but any act that tends to prevent their fulfillment is an illicit or immoral act. A pirate who abducts human beings from a foreign land commits a crime, but he does not destroy the duties imposed upon the wretches he has seized; it is not in his power to make these duties relate to him. If he goes to deliver his victims to a man who pays him the price of his brigandage, it is not in his power to make the individual with whom he deals become the object to which these duties relate; having been unable to substitute himself for the human race, and still less for the Divinity, he has not been able to substitute others. The duties imposed upon men therefore follow them into their slavery, and these duties limit the master's power on all sides: they must be denied for that power to be exercised [362].

It is therefore evident that the simple quality of being a slave-owner excludes, in the one who bears it, any idea of moral duties, and consequently of religion; unbelief in the existence of these duties excludes belief in the precepts and even the dogmas of Christianity; it excludes belief in any relationship between this life and a life to come, between men and the Divinity. Should we now be surprised at the efforts all slave-owners make to brutify all the human beings they possess? Should we be surprised that, to prevent the development of their moral sentiments and the knowledge of their duties, they resort to excessive violence against them and render them powerless to receive any instruction? Is it any wonder that men who do not believe in the existence of any duty in others should themselves indulge without remorse in arson, cruelty, and murder, whenever they need to do so to secure their possessions?

However, slave-owners often engage in practices they call religious; but these are only grimaces they use to more easily deceive the nations: it is a kind of cunning that makes up for what they lack in strength.

"Religion in this colony," says Robin, speaking of Louisiana, "is all form, the substance is nothing anymore. I call substance those notions that religion gives about the Divinity, about the nature of the soul, about its destination, about the duties of society, and particularly about the art, not of extinguishing man's shifting passions, but of directing them. These subjects are no longer part of the religion of these regions, and I doubt the ministers would understand them [363]."

In the United States, especially in the regions where slavery is practiced, religion is likewise reduced to grimaces: it is generally only a political tool, that is to say, a means of deception [364]. At the Cape of Good Hope, the masters show themselves to be very attached to the outward forms of worship: the peasants, says Barrow, carry devotion to an excess that would make one believe that they too know hypocrisy [365]. In the English colonies, it is so well recognized that the masters have no sense of the duties imposed by religion that this fact is beyond question [366]. In the Spanish colonies where slaves exist, religion is reduced to practices or ceremonies; but everything pertaining to moral duties has disappeared from it [367].

Unbelief in the existence of moral duties, and consequently in any moral precept that religion imposes, being a condition attached to the quality of a slave-owner, it follows that the individuals who belong to the master class recognize no authority but deceit and violence; hence the efforts they make to brutify the men they possess or aspire to possess, to prevent the development of their ideas and moral sentiments; hence also, that tendency to substitute for the religious precepts of morality, ridiculous practices, absurd beliefs, and everything suited to depraving the human intellect [368].

If slavery existed only in the islands of America, exploited by blacks, one could hope to restrict its effects within narrow limits; but when one considers that a large part of the population of Asia, America, Africa, and Europe is divided into slave-owners and men who are possessed; when one considers the influence that the former exercise on the fate of nations, one may be frightened by the calamities that still threaten the human race, but one cannot be surprised that men have been and still are largely governed by hypocrisy and brutality.