Parallèle entre les diverses espèces d’hommes. — De la supériorité des unes à l’égard des autres. —

CHAP. 47: > Parallel between the diverse species of men. — Of the superiority of some with regard to others. — Of the causes of this superiority. — Of the difficulty of ascertaining the existence of these causes.

Among the researches to which I have devoted myself in the course of this work, there are none that I have entered into with more hesitation and wariness than those in which I now engage. The intellectual and moral differences that exist between the diverse species of men have been so negligently observed, and the causes that act upon nations are so numerous and often so imperceptible, that it is very difficult, not to say impossible, to determine the degree of development of which each species is susceptible. We have seen, in the preceding chapters, how numerous are the physical circumstances that contribute to rendering a people stationary or progressive; the influence that these diverse circumstances exercise is such that, when one considers them attentively, it takes a certain effort of mind not to be carried away by the opinion that peoples are made what they are by the action that the things surrounding them exercise upon them, and by the diverse modifications that the same things are susceptible of undergoing. If, to the influence of these physical and material circumstances, one adds the influence, which is scarcely less powerful, of some moral circumstances, such as the diversity of religions, the action of nations upon one another, the difference of languages, and other analogous ones, one will understand how much circumspection is needed when it is a matter of assigning the special cause that has produced such or such a degree of development. To have the certainty that an intellectual or moral difference that one observes between two peoples is due solely to a difference of species, it would be necessary for them both to be in a similar position in all other respects; for if there exist for one causes of superiority that do not exist for the other, and if these causes are not inherent in the very nature of man, the difference of species explains nothing.

But, at the same time that these researches on the characteristic differences of the races are very difficult, they are of a high importance: a multitude of causes, which are found sometimes in the men themselves and sometimes in the things in the midst of which they are placed, contribute to rendering peoples progressive or stationary; and there can exist no moral or political sciences, if one does not know the connections that exist between each of these causes and the effects it produces; but do these causes act in the same sense, on the men of all species? Do they act on all with an equal force? If the simple exposition of the good and bad effects of an action and a habit, for example, contributes to the perfection of the morals of a nation of the Caucasian species, will it contribute equally, and in the same proportion, to the perfection of a people of the Mongol species? If sophisms and errors, in the moral sciences, have for their effect to deprave men of the Mongol species, will they have a similar effect on peoples of the American species or of the Malay species? Has the faculty that we have of researching or of grasping the connection that exists between such a cause and the effect it produces, been given to the men of all species? Can the truths that some can discern, also be discerned by the others? Do the passions, which, in a given position, agitate the men of one species, agitate the men of another in a similar position? Can the impressions that determine the action of some, determine the action of all?

If the causes that act on one species did not produce on another the same effects, it would be necessary to treat each of them separately; it would be necessary for each to have a science and maxims that were proper to it; for the facts that one would have observed relative to one, and the reasonings for which these facts would have served as a base, would prove nothing for any of the others. But, as one can observe between nations that belong to the same species, differences as great as those that are said to exist between peoples belonging to different species, one would be obliged to make, with regard to the former, the same reasonings that one would have made with regard to the latter. Each people would then have rules that were proper to it; and there would be almost no science possible, since particular facts could never give rise to a general proposition. A philosopher has observed that there is a greater distance from the intelligence of one man to the intelligence of another, than from the intelligence of one beast to the intelligence of one man. One can also say that there is a greater distance from the intelligence and the morals of one people to the intelligence and the morals of another of the same species, than there is between one people of the Caucasian species and one people of the Mongol species. We would find more analogy between the peasants of China or even of Persia and the peasants of some parts of France or Italy than between Russian or Polish serfs and the cultivators of the north of America. One could therefore apply to peoples of the same species the reasonings that one makes when one compares among themselves nations of different species.

The idea that a same cause does not produce similar effects, when it acts on peoples who do not belong to the same species, is not, moreover, as new as it may at first appear; it has served and still serves as an excuse for the Europeans who have reduced to servitude men of the Ethiopian species or the American species. The same individuals who think that the slavery of whites is proper only to demoralize them and to extinguish in them all principle of activity and industry, do not doubt that the slavery of blacks or the copper-colored is the most proper means to render them moral, active, industrious. They would consider the servitude of the peasants of their own country as the most terrible calamity that could fall upon them; but they think or at least they publish that the blacks who cultivate the lands of their colonies are at least as happy as these same peasants; and the reason they give for it is that they are slaves. It must therefore be that, according to their observations, the same causes produce opposite effects, when they act on men of different species.

If the peoples of each species had remained on the soil that the division of the globe and the direction of the waters or the mountains seemed to have assigned to them, the questions on the differences of the species would not have had the importance that they have today. But, since the Europeans have invaded the American continent, and have mixed with nations of the copper-colored race, without however merging with it; since they have populated the islands they have conquered with individuals of the Ethiopian race, while refusing them all the prerogatives that seem to us inherent in the nature of man; since the South Americans have divided themselves into independent nations, composed of men of several species; since peoples of Europe have carried their domination into a part of Africa, into the islands placed at the southern extremity of Asia, into Hindustan, and even among some nations of the great Ocean; finally, since the most enlightened men of Europe and America tend toward the gradual abolition of slavery wherever it exists, it has become of the greatest interest to research what are the differences that may exist between the diverse species, and what moral and political consequences can result from their mixing, whether for the nations of Europe, or for the nations of the other continents.

The researches to which I have devoted myself in the preceding chapters, having moreover made us discover some of the principal causes that have brought about the enslavement of industrious peoples to barbarous peoples, and the goal that I have proposed for myself in this work obliging me to research what are the nature and the effects of slavery, it is necessary to examine how these effects are modified by the difference of species. We can perceive, at first glance, that, when men enslave others who belong to the same species, slavery does not produce all the effects that it engenders, when the master and the slave belong to different species. In the first case, no external mark distinguishes the enslaved men from the free men; the slaves have no means of knowing their forces and of comparing them to those of their masters. In the second case, on the contrary, each carries on himself, each transmits to his descendants the indelible marks of the class to which he belongs. Each individual who encounters another, can judge, at first glance, whether he should count him among his friends or among his enemies.

“Let us beware,” said a Roman senator, to whom it was proposed to distinguish, by a particular costume, the enslaved men from the free men, “let us beware of giving them the means to count themselves and to count us.”

A difference more pronounced than that which the Roman senate feared, and which would have been so energetic a cause of emancipation among the ancient peoples of Europe, exists wherever men of one species have enslaved men belonging to a different species, and it is nature itself that has established it.

Even in the countries where domestic slavery is almost abolished, but where there exist on the same soil men who do not all belong to the same species, it is impossible that this mixing or this confusion should have no consequences in morals and in politics, especially if it is true, as some writers think, that the men of all species are not susceptible of the same intellectual development and the same moral perfection. A difference of capacity and of morals can only produce others in the creation and distribution of wealth, in the growth of the diverse parts of the population, in the division and distribution of political powers, and consequently in legislation, in the nature and the effects of government. If to the physical differences, so proper to perpetuating the antipathies born of conquest, are joined differences of intelligence, of morals, of wealth, how will it be possible, for example, to establish that equality toward which all the peoples of Europe tend, and which exists between the whites of the American republics? If there is no equality between the species, how to avoid the jealousies, the antipathies, the hatreds that must be the natural consequence of the domination of some over the others? How will these diverse passions not engender sooner or later the oppression and the vices it produces? How, finally, will the habit of oppressing men of a different species not produce the habit of oppressing the men of one’s own species?

These questions do not only interest the new republics of South America; they also interest the peoples of Canada where one likewise finds men of diverse species mixed together; they interest the United States where slavery has introduced a population of blacks in the midst of a population of whites; they interest all the colonies that the Europeans have established in the islands of America or Asia; they interest the immense population of Hindustan; finally, they even interest the peoples of Europe, for from the habit that the most powerful take of oppressing distant nations of different species, is born the habit of oppressing neighboring peoples of the same species, or even of oppressing one’s own fellow citizens. I will expound elsewhere how these vices, or these evils can be born one from another; I have only to examine here the causes that can give them birth.

An English scholar who has devoted himself to profound researches on the nature of the diverse species of men, has thought that the peoples of the Caucasian species are superior to the peoples of all the other species, by their physical constitution, by their intellectual faculties, and by their moral faculties. He has seen the causes of their acquired superiority, not in local circumstances, such as the nature or the exposure of the soil, the course and the quality of the waters, the temperature of the atmosphere, the salubrity of the air and other analogous ones, but in the very nature of the individuals. All the physical circumstances whose influence has appeared immense to us, seem even not to have attracted his attention, for he has counted them for nothing. This negligence has caused him to fall, moreover, into errors that I will have occasion to point out, and which make him lose for a moment the character of a scholar who seeks the truth, to give him the appearance of an advocate who defends a cause in which he himself is interested [514].To establish that the peoples of all species are not capable of the same intellectual development and the same moral improvement, two types of reasoning have been used: first, some of the physical organs of the peoples of the Caucasian species have been compared to the corresponding physical organs of the peoples of other species; it was thought that the organization of the former was superior to that of the latter, and from this the conclusion has been drawn that the intelligence and morals of the former were superior to the intelligence and morals of the latter. Second, the morals and works of the nations of the Caucasian species have been compared to the morals and works of the nations of other species; it was found that the former surpassed the latter, and from this fact it was concluded that the latter were inferior by their own nature and were not, consequently, capable of achieving the same degree of improvement as the former.

In these lines of reasoning, there are two orders of facts that it is important to distinguish: those that relate to the physical organization of the peoples of each species, and those that relate to the moral and intellectual progress of the various groups. The facts of the first order, those relating to physical organization, are considered at once as causes and as signs of the greater or lesser capacity belonging to each species. The facts of the second order, those that pertain to the intellectual development already acquired, are considered as effects and as signs of this same capacity. Regarding these two orders of facts, two questions must be asked: the first is whether they have been well-observed, and whether all have been taken into account; the second is whether, assuming they have all been well-observed, they can be considered the causes or the effects of the phenomenon whose existence one seeks to establish—that is, of the greater or lesser aptitude for civilization.

Before engaging in this discussion, I must observe that I propose neither to prove that the peoples of all species are capable of the same degrees of development, nor to establish what essential differences exist between the men of each species. I find it difficult to believe that either of these two questions can be resolved in a satisfactory manner; but, even supposing them capable of a good solution, I am quite convinced that we are still far from possessing all the elements that would be necessary to resolve them. The sole object I propose at this moment is to examine whether it is proven, as is supposed, that the intellectual and moral differences observed between certain nations stem solely from a difference of species. I will then examine what consequences the physical differences observed between them may have on their morals and on their intellectual development, when, as a result of conquest or slavery, these nations mix with one another.

We have previously observed that our physical organs are the primary instruments that nature places at the service of our intelligence; and from this fact we have concluded that the individual who is endowed with the best organs is also the one who can make the most progress, all other things being equal. The question, therefore, is which race is endowed with the best physical organization; which one has the best hearing, the best sight, the best sense of smell, the most supple hands, the finest touch, the most agile legs, the strongest muscles?

One finds, in the accounts of several travelers, that the peoples of the Malay species, the Mongol species, the Ethiopian species, and the American species see, hear, and smell better than the peoples of the Caucasian species; one also finds that the Malays, the Mongols, and the natives of America have extremities formed in the same manner as ours, but with more delicacy. But one encounters in no work, not even among the writers who consider the Caucasian species to be naturally superior to all others, any observation from which one might infer that the external organs of Europeans are superior to those of the peoples of other species. The superiority of the organs of sight, hearing, and smell that is thought to have been observed among the peoples of colored species is, in my opinion, more apparent than real; but it is at least certain that no one has observed that the peoples of the Caucasian species have, in this regard, any superiority over the others.

If, instead of considering each of man’s external organs separately, one considers the physical individual as a whole, one finds that all species vary in roughly the same manner. There exist, however, some differences between them: the peoples of the Mongol species are the smallest; those among them who have the greatest height are no taller than the smallest of the Malays, and than men of average height in the other species. The peoples of the Malay species are, on the contrary, the tallest and the best-built. One might find, in other species, some individuals as well-built and as tall as any of them; but one could not find entire populations that it would be possible to compare to a Hercules, an Antinous, a Ganymede. The astonishment that the sight of some of these peoples has produced in all the travelers who have visited them proves well enough that they exceed, in the height of their stature and the beauty of their proportions, the most well-proportioned men among Europeans. The men of this species who are placed on the least fertile lands, and under the most rigorous climate, are still handsome men even in comparison to Europeans. The inhabitants of New Zealand, the most miserable of the Malay peoples, are, in stature and strength, far superior to the most miserable peoples of Europe [515].

The average stature of the peoples of the American species is equal to the average stature of Europeans and Negroes; one finds among them peoples who appear to exceed the common proportions among us; it would perhaps be difficult to find, in Europe, entire populations in which the ordinary stature was over six feet; but it is also true that one would have difficulty finding among Europeans peoples as small or as poorly built as those who inhabit Tierra del Fuego. Must one conclude from this latter phenomenon that the peoples of the American species are much more susceptible to physical degeneration than the peoples of the Caucasian species? I cannot think so; at least three conditions would be necessary for the conclusion to be just: the first, that a people of the European species had been found in a position as unfavorable to its development as Tierra del Fuego is to the development of the peoples found there; the second, that it were proven that the two peoples were of similar strength and dimensions upon arriving on the land where they were observed; the third, that the same causes had acted upon both for the same duration of time. But it is to reason in a manner that is hardly just, to claim that the peoples of the American species are more susceptible to degeneration than the peoples of the Caucasian species, for the reason that the former, when they are more miserable than the latter, fall into a more profound degradation. The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from these facts is that similar causes produce similar effects on the men of both species.

One finds, among the men of the Ethiopian species, peoples who have a stature as great as those who belong to the European species; but one also finds some who are smaller. Are the causes of the stature of some and the smallness of others in the nature of the individuals, or in the nature of the soil on which they live? Are the Boschimans smaller than the smallest men of the Caucasian species because their race is more susceptible to degeneration, or because their soil offers them less subsistence? Because they form a particular species, or for other reasons that are unknown to us? Several causes have probably contributed to giving them the dimensions that travelers assign to them; but it is difficult to believe that the nature of their soil, their geographical position, and their way of life have contributed nothing to it, when one sees that, if they are the smallest of the men of their species, they are also the most miserable.

Thus, in considering the external organization of the men of each species, we see that the physical instruments that the intelligence of each has at its disposal have roughly the same perfection or the same power. The Caucasian species, which is considered the most capable of development, shows no superiority over the others, neither in the organ of sight, nor in that of hearing, nor in that of smell, nor in that of touch. If one finds, among some, individuals, or even entire peoples, who are, by their dimensions, below or above the individuals or peoples observed among others, it does not appear that one can draw from these differences any conclusion relative to the intelligence and morals of any of them. It has not been observed that the intelligence of animals is proportional to their mass; and in comparing men of the same species among themselves, we do not see that an individual who is six feet tall is more capable of intellectual or moral improvement than an individual who is only five and a half; we do not even see that the former is more capable than the latter of giving to his physical organs that kind of improvement which consists in executing certain operations.

If the intelligence of all peoples, whatever the species to which they belong, is provided with the same physical instruments, in what parts of themselves must one seek the causes of the differences in morals and intellectual development that are thought to exist between them? These causes can be found only in the very nature of their intellectual faculties, or in the capacity to feel certain impressions more or less keenly, or for a longer or shorter time. It is therefore a question of knowing whether essential differences have been observed between the peoples of the various species, in the nature, strength, or extent of their intellectual organs, in their sensibility, in the manner in which they can be affected, in the nature, strength, or direction of their passions.

It is generally agreed that the brain is the seat of all intellectual faculties, and according as this organ appears more or less developed, one judges that an individual is more or less capable of improvement; this conclusion has been reached by comparing among themselves not only individuals of the same species, but animals of different species or even genera. Individuals of various species have therefore been compared, and it has been thought that those who belong to the Caucasian species had a more developed brain than the individuals of other species; from this the conclusion has been drawn that the former are more perfectible than the latter. For this reasoning to be just, it would have been necessary to make a very great number of comparisons; it would have been necessary above all to take the mean term in each species, or at least to compare the extremes of one species only with the corresponding extremes of the others. But this is not how it has been done; the comparisons that have been made are very few, at least with regard to some species; and one need only glance at the plates that some zoologists have attached to their works to be convinced that they have compared the extreme of one species with the opposite extreme of another. They have described, for example, a very developed brain of the Caucasian species next to a very compressed brain of the Ethiopian species [516]. By following a contrary method, I have no doubt that one could easily prove that Negroes are better organized than the peoples of all other species.

The characteristics that some physiologists attribute to the peoples of the Negro species are: a skull compressed laterally and flattened in front; a low, narrow, and receding forehead; narrow and projecting jaws; the front teeth of the upper jaw placed obliquely; a receding chin and prominent eyes. There is no doubt that one can find individuals and perhaps also peoples of this species to whom these characteristics are suited; but is it possible to recognize by these features those Kaffirs, with high foreheads, whom travelers have considered to be of the same family as the Arabs, and whose women would be beautiful next to European women? Can one recognize in them those Mandingos, those Koromantins, those Mozambiques, who, in the judgment of one traveler, have heads and bodies as well-formed as the peoples of Europe, and whose facial angle in some cases exceeds eighty degrees [517]? It would be hardly just, no doubt, to characterize the entire species by the traits particular to these tribes; but it is no more just to characterize it by the traits of the peoples who are most distant from them. To avoid falling into any excess, one would have to take the mean term; but to find this term, one would need positive data on each of the varieties of which the entire species is composed; and this is a result that scholars are still far from having reached.

The peoples of the Malay species have, according to Blumenbach and Lawrence, a somewhat narrow head; but has this fact been well-established? Might not the entire species have been judged by an extremely small number of individuals, and might not these individuals, taken at random, have been compared to the best-organized individuals of the Caucasian race? I have read, with great attention, all that the travelers recognized as the best observers have written on the numerous peoples who belong to this species, and I have found in them no observation from which one might infer that their intellectual organs are less well-formed than those of the peoples of Europe. I have seen, on the contrary, that all have been struck by the beauty of their proportions; that they have observed among them forms that we are accustomed to considering ideal, because the species to which we belong does not offer us any as beautiful; in a great number of individuals, the regularity of the features and the beautiful form of the heads have been the object of their admiration [518]. It is true that, although the beauty of proportions is one of the characteristics of the peoples of this species, this beauty does not exist in all to the same degree: the inhabitants of the Sandwich Islands and some of those of New Zealand are much inferior to those of the other islands; but it is not impossible that it is by a small number of individuals taken at random from among the former that the characteristics proper to distinguish them all have been fixed [519].

The peoples who belong to the Mongol species are described as having a large and square head; but one finds, among the travelers who have visited them, almost no information on the comparative size of their cerebral organ; some say that peoples they have visited have a small and low forehead, but without indicating whether the other parts are more or less developed; others say they are extremely ugly, but give no indication proper to judging whether they possess an intelligence capable of great development [520].

The peoples of the American species are those who seem really to have a less developed brain than the peoples of other species: they are at least those on whom travelers are in best agreement. However, if one compares the number of travelers who have not observed this compression of the brain among the natives of America, which is considered one of their distinctive characteristics, with the number of those who have been struck by it, one will find that the latter is extremely small compared to the former. One would perhaps even be justified in believing that those who have considered the lack of brain development as one of the distinctive characteristics of the American species have applied to the numerous peoples they did not know, the traits they had observed on the small number of those they had visited, if, among them, there were not scholars whose testimony commands confidence [521].If we now consider that, in all species, with the possible exception of the last, one finds peoples whose cerebral organs are equally developed; that in all of them, without exception, the organs of sight, hearing, smell, and touch have the same fineness or the same suppleness; and that one encounters, among the species believed to be most capable of improvement, nations as barbarous, as vicious, or as enslaved as among the species judged to be the least perfectible, it will be understood that, in the current state of our knowledge, it is very difficult and perhaps even impossible to determine the degree of civilization that each species is capable of attaining. And if it is impossible to mark the point at which this or that species must stop by the very effect of its own nature, how would it be possible to determine the degree of perfectibility that belongs to each? What is the order of truths that, while intelligible to the peoples of certain species, could never be understood by peoples of different species? What is the order of operations that, while executable by the organs of some peoples, could never be executed by the organs of others? What are the vices, what are the virtues that are reserved for this or that people and that are the natural consequences of this or that organization? This is something no one can determine.

The peoples of the diverse species could, it is true, be endowed with a similar organization, at least in appearance, and yet not be endowed with the same degree of sensibility; they might not have the same energy, or might not be affected by the same passions. But have any observations ever been made that could confirm such a conjecture? Have we not, on the contrary, seen the peoples of all species manifest the same passions in similar circumstances? Have we not found in them the same energy when they have been moved by the same interest? We shall see, when I compare the morals, laws, and intelligence of peoples at the diverse epochs of their civilization, that all appear susceptible to the same passions and the same energy, and that, if the physical differences observed between the species produce differences in the affections, it has not yet been possible to assess them [522].

Thus, starting from the comparisons that have been made between the physical constitution, sensibility, and moral affections of each species and those of the others, it is impossible to ascertain whether all are susceptible to the same degree of improvement, or if, by their own nature, some are condemned to remain eternally inferior to others; it is especially impossible to determine the point of civilization or improvement at which the peoples of one species must stop, and the point which the peoples of another species must reach. The facts that have been observed on the physical constitution and on the intellectual and moral faculties of the peoples of the diverse species are still too few, too individual, and too uncertain for it to be possible to draw general conclusions from them, especially when it is a matter of condemning entire populations to an eternal barbarism [523].